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Abstract: In order to research the security of the knapsack problem under quantum algorithm attack, we study 
the quantum algorithm for knapsack problem over rZ  based on the relation between the dimension of the 
knapsack vector and r . First, the oracle function is designed based on the knapsack vector 
 1 2, , , nB b b b   and S  , and the quantum algorithm for the knapsack problem over rZ  is presented. 
The observation probability of target state is not improved by designing unitary transform, but oracle function. 
Its complexity is polynomial. And its success probability depends on the relation between n  and r . From the 
above discussion, we give the essential condition for the knapsack problem over rZ  against the existing 
quantum algorithm attacks, i.e. (2 )nr O . Then we analyze the security of the Chor-Rivest public-key crypto. 
PACS numbers: 03.67.Lx, 03.67.Ac, 03.65.Sq 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Knapsack public-key encryption schemes[1] are based on the knapsack problem, which is NP-complete. 
Merkle-Hellman knapsack encryption scheme was the first concrete realization of a public-key encryption scheme. 
As its secure basis is superincreasing knapsack problem, it has been demonstrated to be insecure. Many variations 
have subsequently been proposed, whose knapsack vector density are less than 1. 3L -lattice basis reduction 
algorithm[2] is a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a reduced basis when given a basis for a lattice. In 1991, 
Schnorr and Euchner presented and improved algorithm[3].In 1992, Coster et al gave an algorithm for low density 
knapsack problem based on lattice basis reduction algorithm[4].If the density of the knapsack is less than 0.9408, 
the knapsack problem can be solved with high probability. Thus most variations of the Merkle-Hellman scheme 
are insecure. However, there is not an efficient algorithm for solving knapsack problem, and the complexity of the 
best algorithm is  22nO n [5], where n  is the dimension of the knapsack vector. 
Shor presented a quantum algorithm for order-finding [6], based on which factoring and discrete logarithm 
over finite field can be solved in polynomial time. The public-key crypto, such as RSA and ECC, is under threat. 
Grover presented a quantum search algorithm achieving quadratic speedup for the unstructured search 
problem[7], which can be used for searching cryptographic key. From then on, lots of achievements have been 
made on the quantum computer and quantum algorithm[8~11]. 
The success probability of the quantum algorithm is depicted by the measurement probability of the target 
state(MPTS). In the existing quantum algorithm, the MPTS is improved by designing unitary transform. For 
example, running quantum Fourier transform once can obtain high MPTS in Shor’s algorithm; running Grover 
iteration ( )O N  times can obtain high MPTS in Grover’s algorithm, where N  is the size of the search 
space. Therefore the success probability and complexity of the quantum algorithm depend on the MPTS. Most 
of the polynomial quantum algorithms can be reduced to Abelian hidden subgroup problem, but knapsack 
problem cannot. Thus, hoe to design the quantum algorithm for knapsack problem based on new method of 
improving MPTS requires further study. 
The best quantum algorithm for general knapsack problem was presented by V.Arvind and R.Schuler[12], 
which is based on the 0-1 Integer Linear Programs and Grover’s algorithm. Its complexity and success 
probability are respective O(c2n/3) and 1. There is no efficient quantum algorithm for knapsack problem. Thus 
we conjecture that knapsack problem can resist the quantum computing attack. 
Since the knapsack public-key crypto is based on the knapsack problem with special property, such as 
superincreasing and low density, it can be broken in polynomial. For the classical algorithm for knapsack 
problem over rZ , its complexity is correlated with n (the dimension of the knapsack 
vector
1 2
( , , , )
n
B b b b=  ), not with r . However, the relationship between r  and the quantum algorithm for 
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knapsack problem over rZ  is still unknown. Thus, based on the relation between n  and r , it is worth 
giving the essential condition for the knapsack problem over rZ  against the existing quantum algorithm 
attacks. Furthermore, it can provide the theoretical basis for the security of the public-key crypto, which is 
based on the NPC problem. 
In this paper, we present a quantum algorithm for knapsack problem over rZ , based on which the 
essential condition for the knapsack problem over rZ  against this algorithm is given. Then we analyze the 
security of Chor-Rivest public-key crypto. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The security of the knapsack public-key crypto depends on knapsack problem, which is NPC problem. 
Definition 1 The knapsack problem [5] is the following: given a vector  1 2, , , nB b b b   and S , 
determine whether or not there exist  0,1ix  , 1 ni  , such that 
1
n
i i
i
b x S

 . 
Knapsack public-key crypto is generally based on knapsack problem over rZ . 
Definition 2 The knapsack problem over rZ  
 is the following: given a vector  1 2, , , nB b b b   and 
S , where 
i r
b ZÎ , determine whether or not there exist  0,1ix  , 1 ni  , such that 
1
mod
n
i i
i
b x r S

 . B  is called the knapsack vector, whose dimension is n . 
In quantum algorithm, quantum Fourier transform is a very important unitary transform, which can be used 
for preparing superposition state and improving the MPTS. 
Definition 3 (Quantum Fourier transform)[13] The quantum Fourier transform QFT on an orthonormal 
basis 0 , 1 , , 1N   is defined to be a linear operator FU  with an action on the basis states described 
by 
1
0
1:
N
jk
F N
k
U j k
N


 . 
Therefore, the action on an arbitrary state may be written as 
1 1 1
0 0 0
1:
N N N
jk
F j j N
j k j
U x j x k
N
  
  
  , 
where the symbol “ ” stands for an invertible transform and 2 i NN e   . If 2nN  , it is called the 
n -dimensional QFT. 
III. QUANTUM ALGORITHM FOR KNAPSACK PROBLEM OVER rZ  
For the classical algorithm for knapsack problem over rZ , its complexity is correlated with n (the dimension of 
the knapsack vector
1 2
( , , , )
n
B b b b=  ), not with r . According to Definition 1 and Definition 2, the bigger 
r  is, i.e. the less the number of solutions for knapsack problem over rZ is, the higher safety of the knapsack 
public-key crypto is. Thus, we present a quantum algorithm for knapsack problem over rZ , which can be used 
for depicting the security of knapsack problem over rZ  based on the relation between r  and n . 
For arbitrary x  and y , z x y   means ( ) mod 2i i iz x y  , where 1 2( , , , )nx x x , 
1 2( , , , )ny y y , 1 2( , , , )nz z z are respectively the binary representation of x , y  and z , i.e. 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
x x

 , 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
y y

  and 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
z z

 . 
For the sake of argument, k  is denoted as the number of the solutions for knapsack problem, i.e. there are 
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k  times  1 2 2, , , ni i inm m m Z , such that
1
n
ij i
j
m b S

 , where 1,2, ,i k  and  1 2 2, , , ni i inm m m Z  
is the binary representation of im . 
Theorem 1 Suppose 
1 1
( , ) 2 ( )
n n
i i i i i
i i
f x y x y b S x b
 
      and 
1
( ) 2
n
i i
i
g z z b

 , where 
, , {0,1, , 2 }nx y z  , 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
x x

 , 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
y y

  and 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
z z

 , then ( , ) ( )f x y g z with 
i i iz x y   if and only if 
i jix m ， i i jiy z m  . 
Proof: If ( , ) ( )f x y g z , 
1 1 1
2 ( ) 2
n n n
i i i i i i i
i i i
x y b S x b z b
  
       
i.e. 
1
(2 2( ))
n
i i i i i
i
S z x x y b

     
Since i i iz x y  , 2 2( )i i i iz x x y    is either 0 or 1. 
Furthermore, j can be found, such that 
2 2( )i i i i jiz x x y m     
Case 1. When 0iz  , 2( )i i i jix x y m   . 
Case 1(a). If 0jim  , { 0, 0}i ix y  , i.e. i jix m  and i i jiy z m  . 
Case 1(b). If 1jim  , { 1, 1}i ix y  , i.e. i jix m  and i i jiy z m  . 
Case 2. When 1iz  , 2 2( )i i i jix x y m    . 
Case 2(a). If 0jim  , { 0, 1}i ix y  , i.e. i jix m  and i i jiy z m  . 
Case 2(b). If 1jim  , { 1, 0}i ix y  , i.e. i jix m  and i i jiy z m  . 
If there is j , such that 
i jix m  and i i jiy z m   
it is obvious that ( , ) ( )f x y g z . 
Thus we obtain Theorem 1. 
According to Theorem 1, we can obtain Corollary 1. 
Corollary 1 Suppose  
1 1
( , ) 2 ( )
n n
i i i i i
i i
f x y x y b S x b
 
      and 
1
( , ) 2( )
n
i i i
i
h u v u v b

  , where 
, , , {0,1, , 2 }nx y u v  , 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
x x

 , 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
y y

 , 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
u u

   and
 1
2
n
n i
i
i
v v

  , then 
( , ) ( , )f x y h u v with i i i iu v x y    if and only if 
i jix m ， i i i jiy u v m   . 
f  and h  is called the adjoint function. According to Corollary 1, if , , ,x y u v  satisfy i i i iu v x y    
and ( , ) ( , )f x y h u v , 1 2( , , , )nx x x  is a solution of knapsack problem over rZ . 
Definition 4 The extended knapsack problem over rZ  is the following: given a vector 
 1 2, , , nB b b b   and S  , where i rb ZÎ , determine whether or not there exist  1,0,1, 2ix  , 
- 4 - 
1 ni  , such that 
1
mod
n
i i
i
b x r S

  . 
Let k   be the number of solutions of the extended knapsack problem over rZ , i.e. the number of 
   1 2, , , 1,0,1, 2 ni i inm m m      is k  , such that 
1
n
ij j
j
m b S

  for 1, 2, ,i k  . 
If    1 2{ , , , 1,0,1,2 1,2, , }ni i inB m m m i k         and {0,1, , 1}B r   , it is obvious that 
4nB   and B r  . Thus, for arbitrary S B , the average number of solutions of the extended knapsack 
problem over rZ  is  
4n r . 
Furthermore, if (4 )nr O , i.e. 4 (1)n r O , we can obtain that (1)k O  . 
Now, we give the quantum algorithm for the knapsack problem over rZ , where r  and n satisfy 
(4 )nr O . This algorithm can be showed as follows. 
Quantum algorithm for the knapsack problem over rZ  
Step1 Give 5 quantum registers, whose dimension are respectively 1, n , n , n  and log 3n n    . 
Their initial state are all 0 . Apply the quantum Fourier transform to the former four registers, then obtain the 
superposition state 
0 0 0 0 0  
           
1 2 1 2 1 2 1
3 1
0 0 0 0
1 0
2
n n n
n
a x y z
a x y z
  
    
 . 
Step2 Perform the oracle function 
( , ), 0
( , , , )
( , ), 1
f x y a
G a x y z
h x z a
   , 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1
3 1
0 0 0 0
1 0
2
n n n
n
a x y z
a x y z
  
    
  
    
1 2 1 2 1 2 1
3 1
0 0 0 0
1 ( , , , )
2
n n n
n
a x y z
a x y z G a x y z
  
    
  
where the definition of f  and h  are the same as Definition 1, 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
y y

  and 
1
2
n
n i
i
i
z z

 . 
Step3 Measure the last register and get A . We can obtain 
2 1
0 ,
1 ( 0
2 ( + )
n
n
z x y
x y z A
t t

 
    
2 1
0 ,
1 )
n
y x z
x y z A

 
   
where ( , )h x z A   , ( , )f x y A   ,  ( , ) ( , )t x z h x z A     ,  ( , ) ( , )t x y f x y A       and 
1
(2( ) 2( ))
n
i i i i i i
i
x z x x y b S

         . 
Step4 Measure the first register and get 0t . Obtain 
2 1
0 ,
1 0
2
n
n
z x y
x y z A
t

 
     if 0 0t  , 
otherwise output failure.  
Step5 Measure the second and third register. We can obtain 0x  and 0y . Set 0 0i im x . 
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Step6 0 0 01 2( , , , )nm m m  is one solution of the knapsack problem over rZ  if 0
1
n
i i
i
m b S

 , otherwise 
output failure. 
Correctness, success probability and complexity are very important in a quantum algorithm. 
Correctness and success probability 
The success probability is unrelated to Step1 and Step2. Only when 0 0t   in Step4 will the algorithm go 
on performing Step5. It is obvious that Step1 and Step2 are both correct. Thus the algorithm’s correctness and 
success probability are only related to Step3, Step4, Step5 and Step6. 
(1) In Step3, we can obtain the measurement result A . 
Case 1. If there are x  and z , such that (1, , , )A G x y z  , 1 x y z A   is firmly included in 
the superposition state and ( , )h x z A   . According to Corollary 1, 0 x y z A   is also included in 
the superposition state and 
1
(2( ) 2( ))
n
i i i i i i
i
x z x x y b S

         . 
Case 2. If there are x  and y , such that (0, , , )A G x y z  , 0 x y z A   is firmly included 
in the superposition state and ( , )f x y A   . According to Corollary 1, 1 x y z A   is also included 
in the superposition state and 
1
(2( ) 2( ))
n
i i i i i i
i
x z x x y b S

         . 
Thus, according to Case 1 and Case 2, we can obtain  
2 1
0 ,
1 ( 0
2 ( + )
n
n
z x y
x y z A
t t

 
    
2 1
0 ,
1 )
n
y x z
x y z A

 
   
in Step3. 
(2) Since 
1
(2( ) 2( ))
n
i i i i i i
i
x z x x y b S

         , for arbitrary jm , 
1
2( )
n
i i i
i
A S x z b S

   ＝  
1
(2( ) )
n
i i ji i
i
x z m b

     
1
(2( ) )
n
i i i i
i
x y x b

      
It is obvious that 2( ) { 1,0,1,2}i i ix y x       and 2( ) { 1,0,1,2}i i jix z m     . If the number of 
 1 2, , ,j nD d d d   is t , where 
1
mod
n
i i
i
b d r A S

   and { 1,0,1,2}id   , we will get t t  and 
t t  . Since x  and y  are independent of one another, 
 1 1 1 2 2 22( ) , 2( ) , , 2( )n n nx y x x y x x y x               can go through 1 2, , , tD D D  . Furthermore, in 
Step4, the probability of 0 0t   is 
1
1
2
tP
t t
   
(3) In Step4, each quantum state 0 x y z A   of the superposition state satisfies  
1
(2( ) )
n
i i i i
i
A S x y x b

    ＝  
For arbitrary jm , there is 
jy , such that 
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2( ) 2( )jji i ji i i jim y m x z m       
i.e. 
1
(2( ) )
n
j
ji i ji i
i
m y m b A S

   －  
Thus, the superposition state must include quantum state 0 jjm y z A . After measuring in Step5, the 
probability of getting jm  is 
2
kP
t
   
According to (1), (2) and (3), the success probability of this algorithm is  
1 2P P P   
1
2
k
t
    
1
2t
   
When (4 )nr O , the average value of t  is (1)O , i.e. the probability of this algorithm is at least 1
2 (1)O
. 
Complexity 
In Step1, the algorithm need take 1 time one-dimensional quantum Fourier transform and 3 times 
n -dimensional quantum Fourier transform. And n -dimensional quantum Fourier transform requires 2( )O n  
elementary quantum gates[13]. Thus, it requires 2( )O n  elementary quantum gates for Step1. 
In Step2, the algorithm requires 2 1n   addition operations, where the addend’s length is 
log 1n n    . And the addition operations requires 2(( log 1) )O n n     elementary quantum gates[14]. 
Thus, it requires 2(( log 1) )O n n     elementary quantum gates for Step2. 
In Step3 and Step4, the algorithm only need take measuring operation. Thus, it requires (1)O  elementary 
quantum gates for Step3 and Step4. 
In Step5, the algorithm need take 2 times measuring operation and 1 time classical computing. Thus, it 
requires (1)O  elementary quantum gates for Step5. The classical computing can be done in polynomial time. 
In Step6, the algorithm need take 1 time classical computing, which can be done in polynomial time. 
Thus, it requires 2(( log 1) )O n n    for this algorithm, whose complexity is polynomial.  
If adjoint function ( , )f x y  and ( , )h u v  are equal, the relation between jm , x  and y can be got. 
Based on the relation, we can construct a system of n  linear equations in n  variables 1 2, , ,j j jnm m m , 
whose rank is n . Further, we can obtain jm . 
Safe parameter of knapsack problem under quantum computing 
The success probability of the quantum algorithm for knapsack problem over rZ  depends on the number 
of solutions of the extended knapsack problem over rZ . If (2 )
nt O  , i.e. the success probability of the 
algorithm is 1 (2 )nO , the algorithm need implementing (2 )nO  times to obtain one solution of the knapsack 
problem over rZ  with (1)O  probability. Thus, to guarantee the security of the knapsack public-key crypto, 
r  and n  must satisfy (2 )nr O , i.e. 4 (2 )n nr O . Furthermore, the bigger r  is, the higher the success 
probability of the algorithm, i.e. the easier the knapsack problem over rZ  can be solved. 
NPC problem is the secure basis of the post-quantum public-key crypto. Since all NPC problems are 
reduced each other, proper parameters are chosen for the post-quantum public-key crypto to resist the quantum 
algorithm for knapsack problem over rZ , which based on the NPC problem. 
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IV. THE SECURITY OF CHOR-RIVEST KNAPSACK PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTO 
Merkle-Hellman knapsack encryption scheme is insecure, most of whose variations are also insecure. Since 
knapsack vector density of these variations are less than 1, they cannot resist the 3L  algorithm. Chor-Rivest 
knapsack public-key crypto is the only known public-key crypto scheme that does not use some form of 
modular multiplication[15]. And it can resist the 3L  algorithm, since its knapsack vector density is more than 1. 
It is shown as follows. 
Chor-Rivest knapsack public-key crypto[15] 
Key generation 
Step1 Choose finite field qF  of characteristic p , where 
hq p  and p h , and for which the discrete 
logarithm problem is feasible.  
Step2 Choose a random monic irreducible polynomial  f x  of degree h  over pZ . The elements of 
qF  will be represented as polynomials in [ ]pZ x  of degree less than h , with multiplication performed 
modulo  f x . 
Step3 Select a random primitive element  g x  of qF . 
Step4 Compute    logi g xa x i  , for each pi Z . 
Step5 Choose a random permutation   on  0,1, , 1p  . 
Step6 Choose d , 0 2hd p   . 
Step7 Compute     mod 1hi ib a d p   , 0 1i p   . 
Step8 Public key is   0 1 1, , , , ,pb b b p h ; private key is     , , ,f x g x d . 
Encryption. B should do the following. 
Step1 Transform the message m  into a binary vector  0 1 1, , , pM M M M    of length p having 
exactly h  1’s as follows: 
i. Let l h . 
ii. For i  from 1 to p  do the following: 
If 
p i
m
l
      then set 1 1iM   , 
p i
m m
l
     , 1l l  . Otherwise, set 
1 0iM   . 
Step2 Compute  10 mod 1p hi iic M b p  . 
Step3 Send the ciphertext c   toA. 
Decryption. A should do the following. 
Step1 Compute    mod 1hr c hd p   . 
Step2 Compute      modru x g x f x . 
Step3 Compute      s x u x f x  . 
Step4 Factor  s x  into    1h jjs x x t  , where j pt Z . 
Step5 Compute a binary vector  0 1 1, , , pM M M M   as follows. The components of M  that are 1 
have indices  1 jt  . The remaining components are 0. 
Step6 The message m  is recovered from M  as follows: 
i. Let 0m  , l h . 
ii. For  i  from 1 to p  do the follows: 
- 8 - 
If 1 1iM    then set p im m l
      and 1l l  . 
The correctness of Chor-Rivest scheme is shown in Reference [15]. 
If we obtain M  from 0 1 1, , , , pc b b b  , it’s easy to obtain m . The security of Chor-Rivest scheme is 
based on the knapsack problem over 
1hp
Z  . 
To date, under classical computing, safe parameters p  and h  for the Chor-Rivest scheme were 
presented in Reference [16], which should satisfy five conditions, i.e. 
(1) p  is a prime, 
(2) h  is a prime, 
(3) h p , 
(4) 11 31h  , 
(5) 44 6010 1 10hp   . 
In this paper, these conditions are called Five Conditions (FC) for short. Furthermore, the greatest prime factor 
of 1hp   is equal to or less than 1310  for computational feasibility. 
If 109p   and 29h  , which are the proposed parameters in Reference [16] satisfy the FC. The 
Chor-Rivest scheme for these parameters is secure under classical computing. 
Since 109 29 1094 (109 1) 3460753.1 (2 )O   , the Chor-Rivest scheme for these parameters can be 
broken with at least 1 6921506.2  probability by the quantum algorithm for knapsack over rZ , i.e. it can be 
broken with ignorable probability in polynomial time. 
Thus, under quantum computing, FC and 4 ( 1) (2 )p h pp O   can be used for depicting the security of 
Chor-Rivest scheme. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The quantum algorithm for knapsack problem over rZ  is presented, whose success probability relies on the 
number of solutions of the extended knapsack problem over rZ . The method of parameter selection is given for 
the knapsack problem over rZ  against the existing quantum computing. However, the quantum algorithm only 
solves the knapsack problem over rZ  with special parameter. How to design a quantum algorithm for general 
knapsack problem over rZ  requires further study. 
This work was supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (Grant No. 2013CB338002). 
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